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The origin of the social approach in language 
and cognitive research exemplified by 
studies into the origin of language
Nathalie Gontier
1. Introduction
During the last years, an increasing interest can be detected in social cognition 
and the latter’s relation to language, as well as the origin of language. In this 
introductory chapter, we trace the origin of this social approach.
It will be demonstrated that the overall social approach in cognitive and 
linguistic sciences stems from the shift in philosophy from the “referential 
approach” to the “social turn”. Both paradigms endorse completely different 
ideas on what cognition is and what role language plays in general cognizing.
This paradigm shift will be exemplified by an analysis of past and current 
research into the origin of language. Origins of language studies carry in their 
theoretical assumptions the shift from a transcendental to a secular world view. 
In the former, it is argued that language is referential for it bears true, factual 
knowledge of the outer, transcendental or physical world. In the latter, it is 
argued that language is social, and rather than provide truth about the world, it 
provides meaning to members of a certain linguistic community.
In the referential approach, language and cognition become intertwined. 
And with the social turn, social cognition and language become related to one 
another. How exactly this happened is exemplified by studies into the origin 
of language.
2. The referential approach to language and cognition
That cognition and language are two intertwined capacities is nowadays an un-
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since when, did the study of cognition become related to the study of language? 
In this section the answer to this question is provided.
The term “cognition” is nowadays by and large a container term that is 
used to denote the various (thought) processes of the mind. The mind, in 
turn, is a concept that is used to refer to the workings of the neurons in 
the brain. And “cognizing” has traditionally been a synonym for thinking 
rationally, i.e. for understanding something by making use of human reason 
or the rational intellect. Throughout Western history, the human ratio has 
always been interpreted to be of a linguistic nature. For many ages, both 
our thought processes as well as our mental concepts have been assumed 
to be structured linguistically. In fact, neurology (Damasio 1999, Ledoux 
1996) only recently demonstrated that our thinking or cognizing can occur 
silently, and that mental categories cannot straightforwardly be associated 
with lexical categories.
Historically, the goal of the ratio or of thinking was argued to be the acquisi-
tion of knowledge, more specifically, knowledge of the physical world.
Cognition, language and knowledge have thus traditionally formed a tripar-
tite and this tripartite forms the foundation of the referential approach. The 
referential approach to cognition, language and knowledge is as old as written 
history and can thus be traced to at least 7,000 years ago. The basic tenet of 
this paradigm is that human cognition is understood as a neutral knowledge-
retrieving device. Human cognition enables the retrieval of factual knowledge 
about the physical world. Moreover, this factual knowledge is assumed to al-
ways be of a linguistic nature because thoughts are assumed to be structured 
linguistically. Language therefore is understood to objectively refer to the outer 
world.
For example, the word “cat”, is argued to be the verbal expression of a mental 
representation of a certain animal in the world. In other words, the word “cat” 
refers to the animal cat, as well as to the mental concept (image or sensation) of 
a cat. All three, the mental concept, the word and the animal are traditionally 
assumed to share some basic properties. Stated differently, in ancient times 
it was assumed that there existed a 1-to-1 correspondence between thoughts, 
words and objects in the world. This position is called realism. Words were 
argued not to be arbitrary signs of mental categories or physical objects, rather, 
it was assumed that words actually provide objective knowledge of the objects 
they refer to. Exactly because of this idea, such an isomorphism between words 
and things could be endorsed.
To understand this view more fully, an overview is given on how lan-
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2.1. Ancient Eurasian cultures
From at least 7,000 years ago onwards, we can find traces in written history 
of the existence of cultures that develop explanations for the presence of lan-
guage. From this time onwards, there is evidence that people believed that 
spoken and written languages have sacred or divine characteristics because 
they bring knowledge in and of the life of men, if not the whole of the uni-
verse.
A Mesopotamian religion called Zoroastrianism would introduce the idea of 
a Sun-God. This is a creating god that stands above and outside of the world. 
And in India, the idea would develop that Sanskrit, the language of the Rig-
Veda, is a perfect, sacred and divine language, as well as that it is the “language 
of the cosmos” (Hewes 1999: 573). The idea of a Sun-God as well as the idea 
of a sacred language of the cosmos would set the stage for all future theo-
rizing on language in (at least) Indo-European countries up until the present. 
Descendents of these first scriptural cultures would populate the Middle East, 
ancient Egypt, ancient Greece, Rome and eventually they would colonize all 
of Europe, and later on also Asia, America, Australia and their original human 
populations. The cultural intuitions underlying these original cultures would 
give way to Ancient Egyptian mythology, Milethic (Ionic) and Hellenic philo-
sophical thought, the three Semitic religions (Judaism, Christianity and Islam), 
Western secularism, humanist ideology and western science.
More specifically, the cultural intuition (Pinxten 1997: 87) developed that 
the world we live in is an ordered rather than a chaotic one, and that this order 
is of a linguistic nature.
In ancient Egyptian mythology, the order in the world is assumed to be the 
result of the “living creator of the life of the world” (Derrida 1981: 87), namely, 
the “enlightened” Sun-God Ra. The latter is also called Re or Ammon-Ra, 
Ammon stands for “hidden”. His firstborn son is the god Theut or Thoth. Thoth 
is the most powerful god in ancient Egyptian religion for he is acknowledged 
as “the master of divine words” (Derrida 1981: 91). More specifically, he is as-
sociated with the thoughts of his father, Ra. Ra’s thoughts are “hidden”. Thoth 
is the one who is able to speak his father’s thoughts and thereby bring them into 
the light (the light in turn is again associated with Ra). He can do this because 
Thoth is the god of speech, and through speech he can make the hidden truth 
and wisdom clairvoyant. Because of this, he is also the god of wisdom, and 
knowledge is understood to be of a linguistic nature. It is thus in ancient Egyp-
tian times that the cultural intuition emerges that speech is both a vehicle for 
thoughts as well as an instrument to refer to (the truth about) the world. Both 
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2.2. The origin of the logos-theory
Zoroastrianism and ancient Egyptian mythology inspired Milethic (Ionic) and 
Hellenic philosophical thought.
In Egyptian mythology, the sun shined upon the whole of its creation, there-
by emanating a hidden truth or order which was made linguistic and thus lit-
erally audible and comprehensible by Thoth. This order, and eventually the 
capacities associated with the god Thoth, would be called the logos by the 
ancient Greek philosophers.
In the 6th century BC, pre-Socratic philosophers, such as Heraclites and 
Parmenides who lived in the Ionian city of Milethe (presently in Turkey), 
would start a philosophical search for this hidden logos or world-order (later 
also interpreted as world-soul). Logos is a concept that translates as order, lan-
guage, reason, thought, doctrine, account, statement, and the laying open of a 
relation (Held and Kirkland 2002: 83; Hillar 1998: 22). All these concepts are 
thus assumed to be synonymous (Coseriu 2003: 24–25).
Steadily, the following cultural intuition would grow: since the logos is lin-
guistic (logos is synonymous for thinking, knowing and speaking), and since 
humans are linguistic creatures, humans carry a part of the logos in them-
selves. Humans are thus actually part of the logos. This is also one of the 
reasons that humans can get to know the logos in the first place, as well as that 
they can lay open the relation between the words and the things.
The nature of the relation between thinking, speech and knowledge would 
also remain the main topic of investigation in Hellenistic philosophy of the 
4th century BC. Hellenistic philosophers raised the following discussion: since 
names are given to true and existing things in the world, are the names them-
selves also true and correct names that connote these things? Associated with 
this query is whether the names are given with insight into the true nature or 
essence of these things, and whether it are humans or gods that give the things 
their proper names.
This discussion can especially be found in Plato’s dialogue entitled Cratylus 
(Plato 1921: 383–440) that was written in 360 BC. In the text, Hermogenes, 
Cratylus and Socrates discuss the origin and nature of words as well as their 
relation to the things in the world.
The dialogue begins with Hermogenes who summarizes the views defended 
by Cratylus so that Socrates can join the debate. Cratylus is said to argue that 
names are “natural” rather than “conventional”, which means that they have an 
inherent rightness and correctness or truth in them. Moreover, all things have 
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Hermogenes (Plato’s Cratylus 1921: 384c–5a) on the other hand, argues that 
the correctness of names, or the truth-value of names, lies in their conventional 
use. Rather than a divine entity or a certain class of humans, all humans agree 
on the words they give to certain things. Therefore, the given name is always 
true and correct, even if one would choose to give the same thing a different 
name in the future. As such, there is no naturalness of names, for names are the 
result of human habits and customs.
Having heard the two positions, Socrates (Plato’s Cratylus 1921: 385b–d) 
takes over the dialogue. He reasons as follows. Suppose I would give the name 
“human” to a horse and the name “horse” to a human. In this case, in my private 
language, horses would be called humans and humans would be called horses. 
However, if one accepts that one can speak the truth as well as that one can lie, 
then there must exists a true and a false language. The true language says it like 
it is – that horses (the name) are horses (the thing) – and speaks of the things as 
they are. The false language, on the contrary, does not say things like they are – 
but argues that a human (the name) is a horse (the thing). Agreeing with this line 
of reasoning, according to Socrates, equals agreeing that with language one can 
say what is the case (the truth) as well as what is not the case (falsity).
If a language is true, so are the names that make up the language. Therefore, 
a thing can only have one true name. All the other names that are used to talk 
about the same thing are false.
That a particular thing can only have one true name is explained by Socrates 
by arguing that the true name says something about the essence of the thing 
involved. More specifically, the essence of a thing is fixed, and since the name 
says something about this unchanging essence, the thing can similarly only 
have one fixed, true name. The word horse, for example, says something about 
the what-ness or essence of a horse: it defines what a horse is. Moreover, this 
definition remains equal for all the horses that have ever existed or shall exist 
in the future.
Now the true name of a thing can only be given in agreement with the es-
sence of that thing if the name-giver has named the thing with insight and 
knowledge into its true essence. Who then is this name-giver that can name 
with insight, and how is he able to do this?
Not just any man can name the things by their right name. Only trained hu-
mans (especially philosophers) and gods can name the things correctly. They 
can name the things by their correct names because they are lawgivers who are 
able to contemplate on, or actually see the true (Platonic) model of both the 
name and the thing. When the name given to a certain thing is the true name, 
the name gives knowledge (epistème) of the thing. If the name is not true and 
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accordance with the mere opinion (doxa) of the human name-giver. Gods are 
assumed to always use the right names because they naturally name with insight 
and knowledge. Humans however, more often than not, name according to their 
opinion (Plato’s Cratylus 1921: 400d, 401a–b), without caring for the truth.
Thus, Socrates argues that the name can differ from the thing it names, 
because humans often have false opinions on the essence of things. The true 
name is that name that resembles the thing, in the same sense as a painting of a 
man, for example, resembles that man, although the painting is not the same as 
the man. An untrue, false name is that name that does not resemble the thing, 
in the same sense that one would argue that the portrait of a female is the por-
trait of the man. As such, names can be untrue and the result of mere opinions, 
rather than that names are always true (Cratylus’ idea). Socrates (Plato’s Cra-
tylus 1921: 430d): “I call that kind of assignment in the case of both imitations 
paintings and names – correct, and in the case of names not only correct, but 
true; and the other kind, which gives and applies the unlike imitation, I call 
incorrect and, in the case of names, false.”
Socrates concludes that there is still room for convention, since the name 
and the thing do not immediately coincide and false opinions can blur the true 
essence of a thing that is normally part of its name.
In sum, it is in Plato’s dialogue that one can find the origin of realism as well 
as nominalism. Within a realistic doctrine one argues that language can pro-
vide knowledge about the world because words form a one-to-one correspond-
ence with the essence of the things. In an ultra-realistic position, the study of 
language therefore suffices to study the world. Within a nominalist doctrine 
one argues that names do not provide insight into the nature of the world or 
the essence of things. Rather things receive their names by convention. This 
position does not exclude the possibility that knowledge about the world is 
nonetheless expressed linguistically. Rather, words arbitrarily refer to certain 
things of the world rather than that the words coincide with these things in the 
world and their essence.
2.3. The Word in Judeo-Christian traditions
From at least the 3rd if not the 6th century BC onwards, the polytheistic religions 
of Egypt, Greece and Rome were countered by Middle Eastern, monotheistic be-
lief systems such as Judaism, Christianity and Islam. In all three traditions, God 
created the universe as well as mankind and language becomes a gift from God.
The first book of the Torah, Genesis, describes YHWH’s creation of the 
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thing he says is “Let there be light” (Genesis, I, 1–3). This verse shows that 
in this monotheistic religion also the sun (Ra) becomes subjected to God’s 
powers, because now the light is created as well. But most of all, this passage 
demonstrates that creation becomes understood as a speech act.
Moreover, Genesis describes how God creates man out of clay (in parallel 
with Plato’s Demiurge), according to his image. He blows Adam’s soul into his 
nose (Genesis 1–2) and this is what brings him to live. Besides God’s speech, 
God’s breath can therefore also create.
Having been moulded out of clay in God’s image, man becomes physically 
similar to God and man too can speak, name and thus rule over creation. This 
ruling over creation involves subordinating and naming it. “Naming is know-
ing and subjecting” (Pombo 1987: 39). In Genesis, II: 19–20, it is told how God 
brought all the animals and birds that he had created to Adam to see how the 
latter would name them. In this regard Adam is similar to Plato’s onomatourgou 
or name-giver (see also Ecco 1995: 7–8 and Pombo 1987: 34–40). “Adam comes 
close, then, to the wise legislator and onomaturge of Plato’s Cratylus, who like-
wise […] determines the name on the basis of his knowledge of the essential 
nature of the object.” (Pombo 1987: 39). In fact, Adam becomes as God in this 
respect.
As shall become obvious in what follows, this part of Genesis would be-
come one of the most important texts in Western thinking, including the 
Western study of language. In general, it would become interpreted as fol-
lows: man received his language, which is a part of the soul, from God when 
he breathed life into Adam. The language spoken by Adam is the language 
that God speaks. This is why Adam (and all subsequent humans such as 
Moses, Job, etc.) can have actual conversations with God to begin with. In 
later writings, this language would be called the Adamic language. Jewish 
scholars as well as Christians would, in agreement with the story of Gen-
esis, argue that at least until the flood (the story of Noah’s ark), the language 
shared by God and his creatures was one. Moreover, it was assessed that 
this language was invariant until the confusion of tongues that occurred at 
Babel.
Regarding the Christian New Testament, especially the Gospel of John (1,2–
1,5) is interesting to place cultural intuitions about language (origin studies), 
for it begins with the verses:
In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was 
God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things were made by him; and 
without him was not anything made that hath been made. In him was life; and the 
life was the light of men. And the light shineth in the darkness; and the darkness 
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In this passage, the “Word” is to be interpreted as Jesus, the son of God (see 
also Apocalypse 19,13 where Jesus is again called the word of God). In the 
Gospel of John, Jesus thus bears striking resemblances with Thoth who is both 
the word of Ra as well as Ra’s substitute. Moreover, in the early Greek versions, 
this Word and thus also Jesus, is called the logos. John can therefore also be 
read as follows: “In the beginning was the logos, and the logos was with God 
and the logos was God.” As the speaking representative of God, Jesus has an 
important linguistic message for God’s creation: namely that they are freed 
from their sins if they believe in God’s name (John, 1, 12). Believing in God’s 
name needs to be interpreted from within Platonic tradition: if they belief in 
the truth and correctness of his name, then they believe that God exists (and 
this name also says something about God’s essence). Moreover, the freeing of 
the sins is, just as creation was, a speech act or a linguistic event. Speaking 
therefore equals enacting and creating.
God as well as his (linguistic) thinking are placed outside this earthly world, 
in analogy to the sun. Human beings, created in the image of God, are able 
to transcend their earthly body (language is considered to be part of the soul) 
as well as the world. They are able to see the whole and name and thereby 
structure its parts in an orderly fashion from a “God’s eye view”. Men can, in 
other words, become as God. With language, humans can be “objective” about 
the world which means that they can obtain and posses true knowledge of the 
world, as well as “objectify” the world, i.e. take and outsider position and look 
at the world as a whole that can be divided and ordered into different parts. 
This line of thought would found the correspondence idea that is typical of 
realism.
More than anything, language would therefore become understood as a 
knowledge device, an objective instrument that orders our thoughts and refers 
to the outer world as well as structures this world. That language is a commu-
nicative device amongst human beings was secondary and at best understood 
as an act of charity by God. Language is understood to be primarily referential 
rather than social or cultural.
A result of this intuition was the Medieval universalia debate. This is a de-
bate wherein the ontological status of particular and universal (general) names 
is investigated (Coseriu 2003: 148–169; De Libera 1995: 319–339). Besides re-
alistic positions, also nominalist positions would be endorsed.
Realists would argue that universal terms, e.g. general terms such as ‘hu-
man’, ‘cat’, etc., are truly existing entities. They exist in a transcendental, idea-
tional world and bring forward the particular, e.g. the ‘specific human’ named 
‘Socrates’. Moreover, that Socrates is human says something about his essence. 














Verlag: Walter de Gruyter P-Nr.: B12-722091 P-Anfang: 26.11.2008 ID: int03 – AGB 1 – 11.08 Printjob: Seiten: 30/44
The Origin of the Social Approach to Language and Cognitive Research  31
subjects that correspond to them. In this line of thought, the word creates once 
more. Realists therefore assume that there is a direct isomorphism between 
universalia, particulars and the things they connote.
Nominalists on the contrary would argue that only particular things truly 
exist and that these things exist independently of the words that denote them. 
Both particular (e.g. ‘Socrates’) as well as universal names (e.g. ‘human’) are 
abstractions of the mind. The shared essence that is presumed to be common 
to all human beings is again an abstraction of the mind. Universalia therefore 
do not have an existence beyond the human intellect.
Besides an objective instrument, language would also become an occult in-
strument whereby one can, through language, invoke or call on God (e.g. by 
saying a prayer) or become God (by saying magical spells such as Abraca-
dabra which literally means “I create as I speak”).
2.4. The Renaissance and the shift in cultural intuitions concerning the 
nature of language
By the onset of the Renaissance it had become a given that God and Adam 
spoke the same, divine language during their communications. This “Adamic 
language” was regarded as transparent, perfect, unique and also as universal 
(Pombo 1987: 38–9). That is, the Adamic language was understood to be a per-
fect instrument of knowledge as well as a universal means of communication. 
It was also endorsed that this language got lost after Babel.
The encounter of different cultures and different knowledge systems through 
trade and colonization would make Christian scholars realize that, contrary to 
the Adamic language, their many natural languages are all but perfect instru-
ments to either obtain objective knowledge or to communicate fluently. This 
situation would become an impulse for the utopian thinkers of the late Medi-
eval and Renaissance times to create a sense of nostalgia towards the period 
that existed prior to Babel, namely paradise where all men were united into one 
folk with one language.
In this regard, the search for the Adamic language would eventually become 
redefined into two distinct problems: (1) the search for a universal language of 
knowledge understood to be of the highest cultural value; and (2) the search for 
the original mother tongue as well as the natural, primordial condition of man.
A rupture would thus emerge between the scholars involved in the search for 
the original language. On the one hand, philosophers emphasized the heuristic 
value of the Adamic language. The Adamic language provides insight into the 
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an a-historic, a-social, objective instrument of knowledge. Its communicative 
value is only secondary. In so far as the Adamic language was lost, rationalist 
philosophers would engage in three things: they would search for natural lan-
guages that could take on the role of the Adamic language (e.g. Greek or Latin); 
they would try and “purify” natural languages (especially German) so that 
these languages could function as universal languages of knowledge; and they 
would construct artificial, logical languages that would enable to gain objective 
knowledge (Pombo 1987: 23). Especially the latter two rationalist endeavours 
would result in the onset of research into the grammatical structure of language 
as well as mental (equalled with lexical) categories of the mind.
On the other hand, philosophers of law, philosophers of economics and 
eventually also philologists would understand the Adamic language to be a 
means to establish a social bond between all of mankind. They therefore de-
fined language as a social, historical means of communication between men. 
This would eventually give rise to the social turn.
3. The social turn
During the past 200 years, the validity of the referential approach to knowl-
edge and cognition has been called into question by “the social turn”. Within 
the social turn, human cognition is not understood to be a neutral, linguistic 
device that is fine-tuned to retrieve factual knowledge of the physical world. 
Rather, both language and human cognition are understood to be an outcome 
of biological and social enculturation processes. Biologically, many aspects of 
cognition are currently recognized as “silent” or non-linguistically structured, 
and thus cognizing does not always make use of the linguistic medium. Socio-
culturally, a large part of cognition is currently recognized as the outcome of 
social enculturation. Moreover, it is endorsed that linguistic signs are arbitrary 
and that they find their origin in society through human convention.
Why then, and since when, did the study of cognition and language become 
related to the study of social life? In this section the answer to this question is 
provided.
Ideas on the arbitrariness of the sign can be traced back as early as the 5th cen-
tury BC, especially in the works of Aristotle. These ideas would mainly be re-
introduced in Humanist circles by (crypto-)Jewish scholars. But it is especially 
during the Enlightenment that one can find the foundations of the social turn 
that would characterize the theorizing on language in the 19th and 20th century.
We now turn to these positions one by one and investigate how language 
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3.1. The arbitrariness of the sign
The idea that the words or verbs are signs that arbitrarily denote different things 
or events, and that these signs are invented by men and agreed upon by con-
vention is not merely a modern, Saussurian discovery. Earlier versions of this 
idea can already be found in ancient philosophical texts. As explained above, 
this idea was already partly discussed by Hermogenes in Plato’s Cratylus. But 
especially Aristotle, a student of Plato, elaborated more fully upon the idea. In 
his De Interpretatione, Aristotle (1995: 16a) writes that the alphabet consists 
of written symbols of spoken sounds, i.e. letters, while the spoken sounds are 
symbols of affections of the soul. They do not correspond to the affections, 
rather, they symbolize them. Both the written as well as the spoken symbols 
can differ in mankind, but the affections of the soul are the same.
The idea that the affections of the soul are similar to all humans is essential 
to empiricist ideas as well as the idea of a psychic unity. The latter doctrine 
says that all men are equipped with the same sense apparatus, and when they 
are put in the same environment and stimulated by the same things, they will 
feel the same sensations. Taken on their own, these sensations are neither true 
nor false, they just are.
Subsequently, these sensations and mental images are labelled verbally by 
convention (which explains why symbolic signs differ within different com-
munities). “A name is a spoken sound significant by convention, without time, 
none of whose parts is significant in separation” (Aristotle 1995: 16a).
Verbs are conventional signs that, additionally to words, also signify time. 
Similar to sensations, both words and verbs are, taken on their own, neither 
true nor false. They are a communal given. Words and verbs are only true or 
false in combination, for example in sentences such as “All cats are Persian” 
which is false and “Not all cats are Persian”, which is true. The endorsement 
that signs are arbitrary therefore does not necessarily question the possibility 
to obtain true and objective knowledge of the world. Rather, truth claims result 
from the combination of words and verbs into sentences.
During the Christian Middle Ages many ideas of Aristotle were condemned 
by the Catholic Church in favour of Plato’s teachings. As a consequence, real-
ism gained more foothold than nominalism. In Jewish traditions as well as in 
Arabic milieus, on the contrary, Aristotle’s work remained influential. Even-
tually, it were mainly Jewish scholars that reintroduced Aristotle’s ideas into 
Humanist, Protestant and eventually Catholic environments.
An interested figure in this regard is Juan Luis Vives (1492–1540). Vives (Co-
seriu, 2003: 170–171) is famous for countering scholastic (Platonic) thoughts 
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neering scholars in semiotics and grammar. But most importantly, he argued 
against universalism in favour of historic particularism, and against language 
as an objective tool in favour of it being of an inter-subjective nature (Coseriu, 
2003: 174–176).
Vives endorsed the view that every language follows its own grammatical 
rules and that words receive their content by convention rather than in accord-
ance with the essence of a thing. Moreover, he primarily understood language 
to be a means to establish or deter social cohesion. In fact, it was language that 
turned humans into social and cultivated beings, and in this respect they also 
differ from other animals (Coseriu 2003: 175). Language enables reason and 
since animals lack language, they are argued to lack reason as well.
Although language is still an instrument for knowledge, it is not exclusively 
understood to be an instrument of knowledge. Rather, in humanist thought 
language becomes associated with the highest form of culture. It is a tool that 
enables general cultivation. According to humanists, language is what makes 
humans educated and therefore civilized creatures rather than beasts (Coseriu 
2003: 292).
3.2. The rise of philology
As already described, during the Renaissance, trade and colonisation resulted 
in the encounter of different unchristian cultures. These cultures as well as 
their languages often outdated the European Christian culture.
A first consequence was that other cultures became understood as pre-
Adamic or, in other words, as “primitive” or even “primordial”. As such, they 
differed from the Europeans who had become “civilized” by the word of God, 
written down in The Bible. Other cultures and their members therefore became 
understood as “uneducated” “children”, “barbaric” “uncivilized” creatures, or 
plain “beasts” that lacked reason altogether. In sum, they were considered to 
live in a “natural” state rather than a “cultural” one.
Secondly, the encounter of other cultures made utopian scholars wonder about 
a “natural” condition of man and how it differed from a “cultural” state. Is a 
“savage” man in a “natural”, “uncivilized” condition, and thus without the word 
of God, capable of distinguishing between good and evil? Is such a man capable 
of reason? Can his knowledge be used to gain truths about the world? And is the 
“cultural” state that “civilized” men find themselves in the best state to live in? 
Are there cultural alternatives? Can one reach a “higher” “civilized” form?
Thirdly, many Protestant as well as utopian scholars would argue that para-
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himself through education. This first of all entailed learning to read and write 
so one can learn (about) the word of God.
These changes in cultural intuitions would set the following cascade of 
events in motion.
First, Europeans started to wonder whether all these creatures are the chil-
dren of God and thus whether all the world’s languages can be united into one 
single mother tongue that was lost at Babel. Those in favour of a unity of man-
kind would argue that there is a universal reason (the rationalists) or a common 
sense (the empiricists) that unites all men. They would therefore also endorse 
single origin theories of language. Those against such a unity would pave the 
way for racism and multiple origin theories of language.
Secondly, the thought-experiments laid open by the utopian scholars con-
cerning “natural” and “civilized” conditions, as well as the Christian ideas 
of the existence of “primordial”, “savage” people would introduce the nature/
culture divide. The mind/body divide had already been a cultural intuition of 
many ages. The mind was rational and the body passionate. The extension of 
this dichotomy to the whole of nature and the whole of human culture only 
emerged from the Renaissance onwards. Not just language and reason, but the 
whole of culture (religion, rituals, customs, law, economics, education, etc.) 
were interpreted as completely different from nature. Culture was argued to 
separate white European men from “beasts” (to be interpreted as animals as 
well as members of different cultures).
Finally, Protestant theologians would argue that the Adamic language is lost. 
It is the God-given human condition if not plain punishment that there exists 
a confusion of tongues. Thus, it is contra God’s will to search for the unifying 
Adamic language. In this regard, the translation of the Bible into many differ-
ent languages by Protestant theologians such as Martin Luther (1483–1546) 
and Jean Cauvin (1509–1564) is to be considered as a pure act of charity (Pom-
bo 1987: 36–37). The many languages became considered as the main obstacle 
that prevented an individual’s salvation. The Biblical translations enabled to 
evangelize all humans and their belief in God might allow the latter to have 
mercy on their souls.
Evidently, to adequately translate the Bible into many tongues one must 
speak several of them fluently, as well as have sufficient knowledge of the 
Biblical textures. It were therefore mostly Protestant theologians that would 
engage in the effort to understand other languages as well as to translate the 
Bible into many tongues. It is in this tradition that textual philology would 
originate (textual analyses of different versions of the Biblical text in or-
der to reconstruct the original version) as well as comparative philology (the 
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ter would emancipate from Protestant beliefs and evolve into comparative 
linguistics.
Moreover, Protestant scholars, again inspired by utopian thinkers (in turn 
inspired by the Bible its eschatological texts), endorsed that perfection did not 
lie at the beginning of time but at the end of time. And this perfection was 
argued to be reachable through civilization. This intuition would eventually 
enable historicist progressive ideas and evolutionary thought altogether.
Regarding language, the Bible says that God brought the animals to Adam to 
see how Adam named them. According to Richard Simon and Grotius (both of 
the 17th century) language was thus an imperfect, autonomous human inven-
tion (Ecco 1995: 86). In the 18th century, Court de Gébelin would therefore ar-
gue that God, when speaking to his creatures, adapted himself to the imperfect 
language that this creature spoke.
If perfection of mankind lies at the end of time, it follows that the beginning 
of time can be characterized as imperfect. How then can one reach perfection? 
It would especially be philosophers of law and economics that would tackle 
this question.
These intuitions would eventually give rise to the many different academic 
fields that exist today: politics, economics, biology, psychology, anthropology, 
sociology, and linguistics. It would be these, at first philosophical scholars, that 
would introduce the idea that language first and foremost is an instrument of 
social life, rather than that it is an instrument of knowledge.
3.3. The search for the social origin of language
Currently, scholars are inclined to understand language as an instrument that 
facilitates social cohesion. This modern notion on language first arises in the 
works of social contract theoreticians such as Hobbes, Locke, de Condillac, 
Rousseau, Smith and Herder. These philosophers are famous for their political 
and moral theories wherein they distinguish between a natural condition of 
man and an artificial, cultural one. This distinction related to the onset of the 
nature/culture divide.
In the natural condition, human beings are considered to be a-moral: they 
are neither immoral nor moral, rather they live according to their natural in-
stincts. The main point of discussion was whether humans are good or bad 
natured. Hobbes, for example, would argue that in a natural condition men do 
not socially enjoy each others company. Rather, they “[…] are in that condition 
which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man” 
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It is only when humans are united into an artificial society wherein they 
give up part of their natural freedom in order to live according to the law of 
the Common Wealth that they become moral and civilized. The origin of such 
a society wherein man becomes civilized and moral is characterized by Rous-
seau (1972) as a situation wherein men engage in a social contract.
What is interesting, but unfortunately for a large part neglected by current 
evolutionary linguists, is that all these political and moral philosophers also de-
veloped theories on the origin of language that were associated with their ideas 
on the rise of a political society. In the same fashion as they emancipated laws 
and ethics from religious thought, they emancipated the origin of language. 
That is, no longer was language understood to be a present from God, rather, 
language became characterized as a human and social (rather than natural) 
invention as well as convention.
In his Leviathan, Hobbes (1902) would write that language is a human in-
vention rather than a divine gift. Language enables social life. Without lan-
guage “[…]there had been amongst men, neither Common-wealth, nor Society, 
nor Contract, nor Peace, no more than amongst Lyons, Bears, and Wolves.” 
(Hobbes 1902: 24, p. 12 in the original). The cultural intuition of this era is 
that, more than anything, language enables and facilitates culture. As a con-
sequence, language is not understood as part of the domain of nature. Rather, 
language is what enables social cohesion within the common wealth. In other 
words, language is something whereby the common wealth can “[…] signifie 
to another, what he thinks expedient for the common benefit” (Hobbes 1902: 
130, p. 88 in the original).
This theme would also be repeated by Locke and Rousseau. In his An Essay 
concerning Human Understanding, the empiricist Locke (1942: 201) would 
argue that “GOD, having designed man for a sociable creature, made him not 
only with an inclination and under a necessity to have fellowship with those of 
his own kind, but furnished him also with language, which was to be the great 
instrument and common tie of society.” And in his posthumously published Es-
sai sur l’origine des Langues, Rousseau would declare that “[…] la parole étant 
la prémiére institution sociale […] [Language was the first social institution].” 
(Rousseau 1970: 27, p. 1 in the original).
Language thus becomes a social and political instrument. It is a communica-
tive device that bonds humans in social life, rather than that it provides true and 
objective knowledge of the physical world.
Language also remained associated with thoughts, especially moral thoughts 
that distinguish man from other animals. That is also the reason why language 
cultivates and civilizes. It brings humans outside of the natural domain and into 
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the subsequent development of languages is first and foremost interpreted as a 
social and cultural event rather than a biological one.
De Condillac, for example, would argue that language originated in a natu-
ral condition as well as from a natural condition. More specifically, language 
originated with the beginning of our species. In the natural condition, all men 
would share a same “language of actions”. This is a communication system that 
is based upon emotional states such as “cries of passion” as Condillac (1746: 
part II, 5–6) calls them. The more language “progresses” and “cultivates”, the 
more such cries are replaced by arbitrary spoken signs. Because of this, lan-
guage is argued to become more abstract and artificial and as such, it becomes 
a representative of culture. In other words, it becomes an instrument to meas-
ure the “level of civilization” one is in.
And also Rousseau (1970: 29 p. 3 in the original) would argue that language 
“progressed” (the word evolution was only introduced later in time) from a more 
natural and “simple, unlearned” state to a more artificial and “complex, educat-
ed” state. The original, natural languages were therefore assumed to be gestural 
and iconic, while the later emerging, social languages were vocal and abstract.
Rousseau argued that in a natural condition, this unlearned pantomimic 
language would suffice for the whole of mankind. In a natural condition, all 
humans express their physical needs in the same, universal gestural language. 
It is our social (second) nature that requires the origin of vocal languages. 
Moreover, it is this social nature of human beings that makes vocal languages 
differ in the first place (because of the convention of the sign), rather than that 
vocal languages too are spoken universally.
3.4. Language and historicism, evolutionism, anthropology and linguistics
By the 19th century, it had become a truism that vocal languages are learned 
through enculturation in a social community. This idea had two consequences. 
To begin with, it became custom to assume that languages can be used as in-
struments to measure the level of cultivation the nation finds itself in. Secondly, 
it would be argued that the state of the nation can be changed by the appren-
ticeship of a different language and its accompanying governmental organiza-
tion. Here lies the beginning of the cultural intuitions that there exists a close 
interrelation between nations (ethnié), languages and a governmental style of 
organization. This tripartite would be poured into a developmental, historicist 
and evolutionist “scale of progress”. The latter would ground nationalism and 
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Within historicism and evolutionism, human history was presumed to run 
through certain qualitatively distinct phases and to “develop” according to 
well-defined historical and evolutionist laws. In practice, this meant that cer-
tain languages or cultural groups were falsely classified as “degenerated”, “less 
evolved”, or “underdeveloped” in comparison to “enlightened” and “civilized” 
westerners. In other words, these historicist and evolutionist scholars used cul-
ture and biology to argue against a psychic unity of mankind, and in favour of 
a division of mankind into different “races”.
Anthropologists, on the other hand, would argue in favour of a psychic unity. 
Beginning with Herder, it was argued that language is a universally shared 
human trait that distinguishes us from other animals, while on the other hand, 
language also allows for cultural particularism and as such causes for differen-
tiation amongst human beings.
As Pan (2004: 14) points out, Herder’s ideas imply that different languages 
will result in different forms of reasoning. Eventually, this idea also allows for 
the assumption that language actually creates a world. Although the idea of 
linguistic determinism (the view that language creates a worldview) is gener-
ally subscribed to Wilhelm von Humboldt, it was actually formulated 50 years 
earlier in time by Herder.
Anthropologists such as Boas would combine the social approach to lan-
guage with non-racial evolutionary biology. Boas distinguished between habits 
that are learned and that become automated, and instincts that are innate (and 
therefore part of the organic). According to Boas (1962: 139), a particular lan-
guage is learned as a habit, while the faculty of language is innate (instinctive) 
and thus the result of our biological endowment. Namely, a habit (or faculty, 
e.g. the language faculty) is biologically (organically, instinctively) determined, 
but the specific content of the habit (or faculty) is acquired. More specifically, 
the content is acquired from society. The habitual use of a particular language 
subsequently becomes automated.
In sum, Boas assesses that a distinction needs to be made between, on the 
one hand, the faculty of language that is innate and biologically determined, 
and on the other hand, a particular language, that is learned in society and that 
subsequently becomes habitually used and automated.
This would inspire Kroeber (1963: 3 – § 2), who argued that culture and 
language need to be interpreted as extra-individual entities that take on the 
form of “more-than-organic phenomena”. The latter is alternatively called a 
superorganic structure. The existence of a superorganic structure would again 
be countered by Sapir (1917). Nonetheless, the latter, together with one of his 
students, Benjamin Lee Whorf (1956), would argue that language is influenced 
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determines an individual’s and a society’s thinking. Both cognition and lan-
guage are therefore immediately social.
Moreover, the distinction between a universal biological faculty of language 
on the one hand, and on the other hand, the existence of particular languages 
that are interpreted as social institutions would remain a recurrent theme in 
linguistics, from de Saussure (1972) to Chomsky (1965) to the present.
Eventually, the social turn would also enter the philosophical realm (Gontier 
2006). Wittgenstein (1989) would argue that one cannot demonstrate that lan-
guage refers to an outer world. Rather, language originates in the social realm. 
Similar to the case of language, knowledge is subsequently first and foremost 
interpreted as a social endeavour, and scientific theories become “languages” 
of society. In the same manner as language is the result of a social contract, 
so scientists endorse in a social contract that determines the rules and politics 
of science. In this post-modern account, convention rather than truth unites 
scientific scholars.
3.5. Evolutionary linguistics
The shift from the referential to the social turn eventually also entered evo-
lutionary linguistics. Not only is it customary to explain language as a social 
phenomenon, nowadays also its evolutionary biological origin is explained 
from within social selection pressures. That language arose for social reasons 
is subscribed to by scholars working within artificial intelligence, primatology, 
psychology, anthropology, neurology, palaeo-anthropology and archaeology 
(see Gontier, 2007 for an overview). Hurford, Studdert-Kennedy and Knight 
(1998), for example, note on the back cover of their 1998 volume:
For the past two centuries, scientists, as children of societies preoccupied with 
technology, have tended to see language function as largely concerned with the 
exchange of practical information about the mechanisms of the physical world: 
tool making, hunting, and so forth. By contrast, this volume (a product of the age 
of mass democracies) takes as its starting point the view of human intelligence as 
social, concerned with one’s own and others’ desires and motives, and of language 
as a device for forming alliances, making friends, and thus achieving successful 
feeding and mating through a complex social network.
Evolutionary linguists however are scarcely aware that a 7–8,000 year old his-
tory precedes their current theorizing on the origin and evolution of language. 
This history nonetheless needs to be taken into account because it explains 
why questions are framed the way they are and why we examine the evolution 
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unaware that the social approach emerged to counter the referential approach, 
potential biases or cultural intuitions such as the nature/culture divide remain 
largely undetected. Moreover, certain intuitions, although they have lead to 
new avenues of research, currently remain ungrounded. That words for exam-
ple arise as a result of social convention rather than that they are the outcome 
of private thought, is an intuition that has become such a truism that scholars 
mostly do not focus on grounding this intuition scientifically.
With this article some of these historical biases have been exposed and the 
hope is cherished that in the future, the social approach will become the subject 
of reflexivity as well as firmer scientific grounding.
4. Conclusion
As far as we can trace written history of certain cultural ideas back in time, 
language has been the subject of investigation from at least 7,000 BP onwards. 
Language has traditionally been understood as a trait of a divine entity, a divine 
entity tout court (e.g. in the idea that the word has become flesh), or a gift from 
God to humans. It is a shared device that allows God and men to abstract hid-
den knowledge (i.e. the underlying structure of the physical or transcendental 
world) and as such create order.
Since language leads to the eternal truth, and truth is one, there can only be 
one true language that says it like it is. It follows that all other languages are 
false derivatives of the first, true language. The origin of ideas on purification 
of existing languages, the search for the Adamic language, or the creation of 
universal languages is not that hard to understand from within this cultural 
background.
It additionally explains why thoughts are associated with language, why lan-
guage is reduced to the study of the word, why words and thoughts are argued 
to be re-presentations of things, and why language is only secondarily a com-
municative device. If it is the goal to reach individual salvation or happiness, it 
is merely an act of charity to instruct others in the true word.
The search for the universal divine language actually triggered the idea that 
there was a primordial, natural condition. The latter, so it is argued, is distinct 
form the current, cultural “perverted” condition. Beginning from the Renais-
sance onwards, language becomes primarily understood as a communicative 
device. Rather than transmit knowledge, language enables the transmission 
of social information between members of the same community. Language 
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In this regard, language becomes a representative of all that is cultural which 
in turn becomes opposed to all that is natural. Language becomes a measure 
as well as a representative, not of truth (as e.g. Thoth or Jesus are), but of social 
life, political coherence, and culture altogether. Besides being a measurement 
of the degree of civilization one is in, it enables education and language can 
therefore lead to patriotism or nationalism. Language enables cultivation into 
social, political and cultural life. Rather than being a device of knowledge, it 
becomes a device for the transmission of culture.
It is in this climate that the emphasis on the word is loosened to include 
the study of syntax, and that the question on the biological origin of language 
is first posed. Originally, language is argued to have originated out of moral 
needs, a characteristic that enables men to be lifted up from the condition of 
animals. Passionate cries and gestures are argued to become combined into a 
pantomimic language and eventually spoken language emerged.
Language, in this view, not only enables social cohesion and the possibility 
to transcend a natural state, language actually influences the type of cultural 
environment one creates and vice versa, the cultural environment influences 
the language that is spoken.
These ideas paved the way for the doctrine that language creates an idiosyn-
cratic worldview rather than that it objectively lends insight into the outer world 
that exists independently of human beings. Moreover, in post-modern times, 
politics, science, culture etc. become nothing more than languages or regimes 
that determine from within, the rules according to which one has to play to be 
political, scientific, etc.
And within Post-Neodarwinian traditions, it is argued that language evolved 
because of this social aspect that language enacts. Given the long historical 
background, the latter however should become the main topic of scientific in-
vestigation rather than that it is taken as a truism that guides current theorizing.
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